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CORPORATE LAW .A.S A FACILITATOR OF
SELF GOVERNANCE
Edward Rock* and Michael Wachter ..
A few years ago, we began working on a series of articles that
brought together our separate research agendas. We found a
natural resemblance between two seemingly different approaches.
One of us, Professor Edward Rock, has argued that a distinctive
quality of Delaware fiduciary duty law is that it fits poorly into a
rule-oriented approach. 1 Instead, Professor Rock argued, one should
think of fiduciary duty cases as judicial sermons that exhort
managers to consummate performance and that criticize those who
perform below expectations, even if, or perhaps especially when, no
direct legal sanction is imposed. 2 The conclusion was the message
that "legal sanctions were little more than place-holders for the
accumulation of the messages." 3
Professor Michael Wachter, working jointly with others, had
argued that inside the firm the actors protect the integrity of their
relationships on their own, eschewing the protections of legal
sanctions. Rather than relying on costly contract-writing that would
be enforced by third parties, the actors adopt arrangements that are
self-enforcing. Tied to the theory of the firm, one lesson was that
the relationships that are brought inside the firm are precisely those
relationships that are less expensively governed by self-enforcing
arrangements. 4

• Professor of Law and co-director of the Institute for Law and Economics, University
of Pennsylvania.
•• William B .•Johnson Professor of Law and Economics and co-director of the Institute
for Law and Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
1
Edward Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44
UCLA L. Rev. 1009 (1997).
2
Id. at 1015.
3
Id. at 1016.
4
E.g., Michael L. Wachter & Randall D. Wright, The Economics of Internal Labor
Markets, 29 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 240 (1990), reprinted in THE ECONOMICS OF HUMAN
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (D.J.B. Mitchell & M.A. Zaidi eds., 1990); Oliver E. Williamson,
Understanding the Employment Relation: The Analysis of Idiosyncratic Exchange, 6 BELLJ.
ECON. 250 (1970), reprinted in THE ECONOMIC NATURE OF THE FIRM (L. Putterman & R.S.
Kroszner eds., 2d ed. 1996).
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In retrospect, those articles were part of a different discussion.
They were an attempt to understand the role of non-legally enforced
norms in corporate law on the one hand and in employment
relationships in the firm on the other .5 The resemblance between
our previously distinct lines of research runs deep. In a series of
joint papers, we have considered the relationship between law and
norms in corporation law, and recently we have developed a more
general theory that brings together corporation law and the theory
of the firm. 6 In this Essay, we outline briefly this general theory,
which we are developing in more detail elsewhere, and discuss how
embracing this approach would affect the way one teaches the basic
Corporations course. 7 In this general theory, we try to bring
together property rights and transaction cost theories of the firm
with the norms literature to recast our understanding of the
fundamental structure of corporate law.
We begin with what we consider to be the standard view. In the
standard approach, one tells one's students that the corporate form
has four characteristics: limited liability for investors, free transferability of investments, legal personality, and centralized management. This ordering of the characteristics, more often than not,
conveys their relative importance. If one views the corporation as
a nexus of contracts, the shareholder/firm nexus is the focus of
corporation law. Limited liability, free transferability, and to a
lesser extent, legal personality, establish the contours of the
shareholders' "contract" with the firm. The design of corporation
law is then to minimize both the agency costs between shareholders
and managers, by bringing their interests into alignment, and the
collective action problems that arise when shares are widely held

5
In 1996, the University of Pennsylvania Law Review devoted an entire symposium to
the subject "Law, Economics, & Norms." Symposium, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643, 1643-2339
(1996).
6
Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Waiting for the Omelet to Set: Match-Specific
Assets and Minority Oppression in the Close Corporation, 24 J. CORP. L. 913 (1999); Edward
B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Tailored Claims and Governance: The Fit Between Employees
and Shareholders, in EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE GOVERNAL"'CE (Margaret M. Blair & Mark
J. Roe eds. , 1999); Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, The Enforceability of Norms and
the Employment Relationship, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1913 (1996).
7
Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms and
the Self Governing Corporation (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).
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and which make it difficult for shareholders to minimize agency
costs. If one takes this view, much of corporation law can be
understood as a solution to one or another of these problems.
Professor Rock formerly took this approach and, in doing so, was
clearly not alone .
Our approach breaches with this tradition. As we discuss below,
if the four characteristics of the corporate form are ranked in terms
of their importance, centralized management becomes the first
rather than the last of the four. This shift has fundamental
implications for how one understands and teaches corporate law.

I. THEORIES OF THE FIRM
A theory of the firm-by describingwhywe have firms, what goes
on inside firms, and what are the boundaries of the firm-helps us
identify the key problems that parties to the firm need to solve. A
theory of the firm can also help us figure out what problems the
parties are able to solve themselves, how they solve them, and the
role the law plays in facilitating solutions or in interfering with
solutions.
Three competing theories of the firm have been developed and
refined over the past several decades. While not mutually exclusive,
each has had different implications for corporate law. For the last
fifteen years, most scholars who addressed the connection between
the theory of the firm and corporate law focused primarily on the
agency cost theories of the firm associated with Alchian and
Demsetz8 and with Jensen and Meckling. 9 Agency cost theories of
the firm, however, are incomplete in four important dimensions.
First, they provide no theory of the boundary between the firm and
the market. Second, agency cost theories provide no explanation of
the "core" of the firm, that which allows the firm to thrive in
competitive product markets. Third, at least as applied in corporate
law, these theories focus too much on the isolated contracting node

8

Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic
Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 778 (1972).
9
Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 305 (1976).
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of the firm, failing to place it in the broader operational context in
which the firm operates. In so doing, the theories fail to identify the
re a sons that centralized management is central. Finally, they fail
to differentiate between legally enforceable provisions and nonlegally enforceable norms.
In the years since Jensen and Meckling, a complementary
"property rights" approach has been developed, primarily by
Grossman, Hart and Moore, which helps explicate the firm's "core." 10
At the same time, over a somewhat longer period, the transaction
cost theories of the firm , largely associated with Oliver Williamson,
have focused on the firm-market boundary. 11 In our working paper,
we set forth a view of the firm that draws on and extends these two
literatures, and looks at the connection between these property
rights theories and understanding corporate law.
We take the firm to be a locus of specific investment in which
transaction costs are sufficiently high that contractual incompleteness is inevitable. In this picture of the firm, several overlapping
features emerge as particularly significant.
First, at the core of the firm are its physical and intangible
assets. These assets are owned by the firm in that the firm has
residual control rights and can allow or deny access to them. Many
of these assets are specific to the firm and, given their uniqueness,
provide the firm with whatever competitive advantages it enjoys .
For the corporation to succeed in maximizing free cash flow , it must
purchase assets required to maintain its competitive advantage
while shedding those that are not needed.
Second, employees are given access to selected assets, and many
make match-investments in the individualized assets with which
they work. The difference between employees and the outside
suppliers and customers, who may also work with or around the
firm's assets, is that the employment relationship is brought inside
the firm, thereby marking the firm's boundaries. Asymmetry of
information abounds, primarily but not entirely due to asset

10

Stanford J . Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A
Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691, 693 (1986); Oliver Hart &
John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J . POL. ECON. 1119, 1120 (1990).
11

OLIVER E . WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES:
IMPLICATIONS 29-55 (1975).

ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST
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specificity. This circumstance requires a mechanism that protects
the corporation's, the suppliers', and the employees' investments in
match assets.
Third, the distinguishing feature of the activities brought inside
the firm is that the intra-firm activities are marked by numerous
and recurring transactions over an indeterminate period of time. In
this environment, contracting within the firm is necessarily
incomplete, with the result that a noncontractual governance
system must be adopted to protect the integrity of the transactions
between the employees and the firm (and to a lesser extent between
the suppliers and customers and the firm). In deciding which assets
to buy, which employees to assign to specific assets, and which
relationships to bring inside the firm, the firm relies on centralized
management.
Under these conditions, a set of governance problems must be
solved in order to produce widgets optimally and to maximize the
free cash flow available to shareholders.
First, property
rights-defined here as the power to determine access to specific
assets and the residual power of control-must be assigned. Second,
the potential for opportunism that always arises from investments
in specific assets must be controlled. This opportunism can arise in
three different contexts. The critical employee may threaten to
leave with key information still in his head; the firm may threaten
to fire a key employee once he has transferred the information in his
head to the firm; or, finally, controlling shareholders may threaten
to mistreat non-controlling shareholders. The governance structure,
while minimizing agency costs, must also solve the operational
problem of maximizing free cash flow. Taking all this to be true, the
question becomes what does this tell us, first, about corporate law,
and, derivatively, about how to teach corporate law?

II. THE PRINCIPAL IMPLICATIONS FOR CORPORATE LAW
In this section, we outline, without fully defending, what we take
to be the principal implication of the preceding view of the firm for
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corporate law. This discussion is only a summary. For a full
defense, we refer people to our working paper. 12
First, relationships within the firm will largely be governed by
norms rather than law. Here, by "norms," we mean "non-legally
enforceable rules or standards." In our working paper, we propose
the acronym NLERS, in order to avoid confusion with the variety of
other meanings of the term "norm." In relationships governed by
NLERS, understanding the role of the law is tricky. In an NLERS
world, the private actors create and enforce most of the rules. One
must thus explore the extent to which the law facilitates or
undermines the establishment and maintenance of NLERS
governance.
Second, the corporate form itself-typically chosen by both
publicly held and closely held firms-sets up a remarkably robust,
"incentive compatible," self-enforcing solution to the problems that
the firm must solve. This form goes a long way toward creating an
environment for NLERS governance.
Because the corporation is a legal person, it can hold property.
By providing that the business and affairs of the corporation will be
managed by or under the direction of the board of directors 13 and
that directors will be elected by the shareholders, 14 the Delaware
statute creates centralized management. In so doing, it assigns to
central management the right to determine the optimal asset set
and the utilization of those assets in order to maximize the corporation's value. Shareholders vote on extraordinary asset purchases or
sales and on mergers, but not on the ordinary operating decisions.
These two features thus define, assign, and centralize the core
property and control rights. Without these features, firms could not
succeed. Every type of governance problem would emerge, from
decisions on how to attract and retain individuals willing to work
with specific assets, to questions of direction and coordination of the
work to be done. In fact, however, these problems rarely emerge.
Instead, the governance system with respect to physical and
intangible investments works so well that we often neglect to credit

12
13
14

I

l
' !

Rock & Wachter, supra note 7.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1998)
Id. § 211 (1998).
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its accomplishment. By creating the foundations for the firm to
operate under centralized management, corporate law answers the
question of who gets to "run" the company.
The corporate form resolves other governance questions as well.
By providing the firm with an indefinite term of operations, this
form solves problems involving opportunism that arise in the last
period. Because dissolution requires a board resolution and a vote
of a majority of the shares, individual minority shareholders have
no power to trigger dissolution. Minority shareholders likewise
have no right to be bought out because, under the standard
corporation laws, no shareholder has a general right to be bought
out. This prevents any individual non-controlling shareholder from
threatening dissolution in order to increase his share of the surplus.
Similarly, the corporate form handles potential opportunism by
the controlling shareholders toward the non-controlling shareholders . Here the critical mechanism is the prohibition on non-pro-rata
distributions. Dividends-by definition-must be paid pro rata.
Upon dissolution, anything left after creditors are paid off is
distributed pro rata to the shareholders. 15 These terms provide a
first-order solution to majority opportunism by yoking the interests
of the controlling shareholder to those of the minority. So long as
non-pro-rata distributions are prevented, the controlling shareholder, in maximizing the value of his stake, likewise maximizes the
value of the minority shares. If the controlling shareholder wants
to get money out of the firm, minority shareholders receive their cut
as well, either through dividends or upon dissolution of the firm.
It is also clear why these terms must be legal terms. The legal
forms efficiently provide the initial default settings, allowing the
parties to choose easily between centralized and decentralized
management. Moreover, once the firm gets started and especially
in the last period, gains from opportunism can be very large,
whether in the form of the controlling shareholder stealing from the
firm or the minority shareholder holding up the controlling shareholder. Socially acceptable NLERS sanctions may not be sufficiently
robust to constrain such behavior.

15

Id. § 281.
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Finally, on this view of corporate law, fiduciary duties play quite
an interesting role that is not generally recognized. In understanding the role of fiduciary duties, three goals must be kept in mind.
First, the key coordinating function served by centralized management must be preserved. Second, both minority and majority
opportunism must be discouraged. Third, the self-governing
character of the relationship must be preserved.

III.

THE DUTY OF LOYALTY

The duty of loyalty is the second half of the prohibition on nonpro-rata distributions. The first piece, mentioned above, is the
statutory requirement that dividends be paid out pro rata according
to the number of shares, with the linked requirement that upon
dissolution, all shareholders share pro rata. But there are a
multitude of ways to evade such a rule. The role of the duty of
loyalty is to provide an ex post check, to prevent enough instances
of self-dealing from slipping through so that the overall incentive
compatibility of the form is preserved. The form maintains its
usefulness if some self-dealing gets through, but not if too much
does.
Each of the major aspects of the duty of loyalty blocks one of the
most obvious modes of siphoning off assets. The limitations on basic
self-dealing attempt to prevent the grossest sorts of theft, while
encouraging the use of processes that will preserve enough flexibility to permit transactions that will benefit the firm. The treatment
of compensation, similarly, is understood as a judicial attempt to
prevent the worst sorts of self-dealing, while allowing enough
flexibility in structuring compensation so as to encourage managers
to perform well. Finally, the various strands of the corporate
opportunity doctrine seek to strike a similar balance.
As such, the role of the duty of loyalty is to provide a check on
majority opportunism . Because of the gains available to the
majority from stealing, the check must be legal. But, at the same
time, the check is constrained. The idea is to keep the controlling
shareholder in the flock, working for the advantage of the group.
The law plays the role of sheep dog, but does not intervene beyond
what is necessary.

I
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IV. THE DUTY OF CARE

From this perspective, the duty of care and the business judgment rule are more remarkable . The duty of care is typically taken
to be some sort of negligence rule, which is operationalized through
the business judgment rule. The puzzle posed by the duty of care is
that if it is a negligence rule, why are findings of negligence so much
less common than in other cases of professional malpractice? 16
In our view, the difference lies in the context in which the parties
establish their relationships. Corporate decisionmaking is NLERSgoverned while medical malpractice law and other professional
malpractice is and typically must be law-governed. To unpack this
claim, it is useful to proceed in several steps.
First, medical malpractice in particular, and negligence in
general, represent the use of legal sanctions to control conduct.
NLERS governance is unlikely to work in the typical negligence
context because the interaction among the parties is typically one
shot, with no opportunity to negotiate terms. In the medical
malpractice context, while there may be some opportunity to
negotiate terms, the difference in knowledge between doctor and
patient, the imperfections of the markets, and the magnitude of the
harm are such that the opportunity to negotiate terms is limited.
Again, the stakes are sufficiently high that NLERS are unlikely to
suffice .
Directors and shareholders, by contrast, are in a continuous set
of interactions. As argued above, and discussed in more detail in
our working paper, the nature of the relationship between the
parties and the density of match assets are such that it is in just
such cases that NLERS governance is likely to trump law governance. Our argument, then, is that the difference between the
directorial and the medical duty of care is not in the nature of the
decisions-as Eisenberg suggests 17-but in the nature of the
relationships among the actors.

16

For important contributions to this discussion, see Melvin A. Eisenberg, The
Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review in Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM
L. REV. 437 (1993); Fra nklin A. Gevurtz, The Business Judgment Rule: Meaningless Verbiage
or Misguided Notion?, 67 S. CAL. L . REV. 287 (1994).
17
Eisenberg, supra note 16.
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From this perspective, the business judgment rule looks strikingly like the employment-at-will doctrine in employment law. It is
a rule of judicial non-intervention. The boundary ofthe firm is both
an economic and a jurisdictional boundary. Under the employmentat-will doctrine, an employer may discharge an employee for good
reason, bad reason, or no reason at all. 18 In other words, the courts
are unwilling to rule on the reasons for discharge, leaving it to the
parties to work out. Similarly, in the corporate context, the actual
standard of review applied by courts to corporate decisionmaking
can generally be described as no liability for negligent
decisionmaking absent self-dealing.
Understood this way, the business judgment rule serves several
purposes by preventing non-controlling shareholders from complaining to a third party about the business decisions of central managers. First, intervention by third parties interferes with centralized
management. Second, the ability to appeal to a third party provides
a tool that can be used strategically by minority shareholders.
Third, the ability to appeal to a third party undermines the selfgoverning quality of the relationship. As such, the business
judgment rule is about preserving centralized management,
preventing minority opportunism, and preserving NLERS governance.

V. THE LIMITS OF NLERS SELF GOVERNANCE
The truly interesting cases are those in which the court refuses
to apply the business judgment rule because of "gross negligence,"
as in Smith v. Van Gorkom, 19 or because a number of the directors
fail to satisfy the independence requirement, as in Cede & Co. v.
Technicolor. 20 What are the courts doing when they seem to demand
that the board follow a particular process or methodology?
One approach is to view these cases as cases of suspected selfdealing, in which bad process is viewed as a red flag indicating self-

18

On the employment-at-will doctrine as a jurisdictional rule preserving norm
governance in the employment relationship, see Edward B. Rock & Michael L . Wachter, The
Enforceability of Norms and the Employment Relationship, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1913 (1996).
19
488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
20
634 A.2d 345 (Del.), modified, 636 A.2d 956 (Del. 1994).
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dealing even if there is no good evidence of self dealing in the record.
Read this way, these cases really become an appendix to the selfdealing doctrines of the duty ofloyalty.
The opinions do not read this way, however. In reading either
Va.n Gorham or Cede, one has little sense that the judges, both on
the Delaware Court of Chancery and the Delaware Supreme Court,
think that self-dealing is going on. They are offended by something
else. In the case of Va.n Gorlwm, they seem to be offended by Van
Gorkom acting in a headstrong, imperious way, pushing through the
deal without following appropriate process. 21 Similarly, in Cede, the
Delaware Supreme Court is bothered both by Chancellor Allen's
analysis and application of the duty of care as a negligence rule, and
by the presence of a director who received a (disclosed) finder's fee
in connection with the transaction.22
The better reading of these cases is that judicial scrutiny is
appropriate because selling the company puts the directors into the
"last period" of play. Like the self-dealing cases, these cases stand
for the proposition that NLERS self-governance potentially breaks
down in the last period of play, and therefore the courts have to
scrutinize the behavior and results carefully (which they call "entire
fairness" scrutiny).
VI. THE COURTS AND THE TRANSMISSION OF NLERS:
STORIES ABOUT SAINTS AND SINNERS
This analysis brings us to the question of how NLERS are
transmitted and what role, if any, Delaware judges play in that
process. The first, and clearly most important, transmission device
for NLERS is competitive markets. While centralized management
will, in the first instance, choose the NLERS for the firm, this is
done against the background of a market check. Beyond competitive
markets, there are a variety of transmission mechanisms. Business
schools and consultants play a significant role. Directors who serve
on more than one board can act to cross-fertilize. Lawyers likewise

21

22

Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 866-69.
Cede, 634 A.2d at 368-69.
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often see a wide range of variations and develop notions of best
practice.
Where do the Delaware judges fit in here? If one takes management buyouts (MBOs) of large, publicly held corporations as an
example, one finds that the use of a special committee, while clearly
recommended by the Delaware courts-and a largely accepted
practice-is neither necessary nor sufficient for the validity of the
transaction. Thus, it seems to be an NLERS. The Delaware courts,
during the 1980s, played a central role in articulating and encouraging the use of special committees in MBO transactions, often by
criticizing or complimenting particular lawyers and directors
without imposing any sanction. 23
Similarly, Delaware's encouragement of the use of independent
directors in conflict transactions, although again neither necessary
nor sufficient, can likewise be understood as an effort to spread the
emerging best practice. In that context, indeed, the Delaware
courts' role may be to spread best practice among companies and,
especially, from large companies to smaller ones.
In both cases, if the Delaware courts are, indeed, playing a role
in the transmission of NLERS, they are doing so within a narrow
compass. The NLERS they encourage are within the scope of
lawyers' traditional expertise: process-based, institutionally subtle
governance mechanisms designed to control complicated conflicts of
interest. Judges typically drawn from the Delaware corporate
bar-or, when not, rather quickly socialized by those who
were-occupy an odd sort of insider-outsider position. From years
of corporate practice, they typically know much about the way the
corporate world works. But, at the same time, they develop a sense
of the limitations of the judicial role, especially with respect to
encouraging excellent management or punishing bad management.
This perspective puts them in the position of having at least some
credibility to influence this specialized set of NLERS, especially in
publicly held corporations, through criticism unaccompanied by
legal sanction.
Because they are encouraging the development of NLERS,
however, these judges do not do so by the straightforward applica23

Rock, supra note 1, at 1103-04.
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tion of legal sanctions. Rather, the possibility of intrusive scrutiny
provides the incentive for the development or internalization of
appropriate modes of behavior, coupled with the withering denunciations of self-dealing that courts are capable of delivering.
Here we find a dual explanation for the peculiar quality of
Delaware case law. First, the judges are insiders and thus recognize
and feel confident about condemning bad behavior in strong terms.
Second, judges function in, and deeply respect, the NLERS selfgovernance of the corporation, and thus are reluctant to disturb it.
Put these two factors together, and you predict vigorous criticism
unaccompanied by legal sanctions.
Van Gorkom provides a wonderful case to examine the conflicts
that can emerge when case law is operating at the boundary
between legally enforceable and non-legally enforceable rules and
standards. In finding directors personally liable for selling Trans
Union at a price far above the pre-deal stock price, but with minimal
process, 24 the Delaware Supreme Court appeared to expand the
scope over which it would find violations of the duty of care and
second-guess corporate decisions. By appearing to have upset the
balance between self-governance and legal enforceability, the
decision led to widespread criticism, ending with an amendment to
the Delaware statute, section 102(b)(7). 25 This amendment, by
permitting corporations to opt out of liability for breaches of the
duty of care, re-established the pre-existing structure in which the
duty of care was almost entirely enforced by non-legal sanctions
and, when enforced by legal sanctions, by equitable relief. From a
legal centrist viewpoint, the impact of the case is unclear: the case
might be understood to have increased the standard of care, but, by
limiting liability, to have decreased the cost of violations.
The actual legacy of the case, however, seems to have been quite
different. Although the court was sketchy in describing the error
committed by the directors in Van Gorkom, a more deliberate
process was quickly incorporated into the prevailing NLERS.
Regardless of whether the court was correct that Van Gorkom and
the other defendants behaved with gross negligence, the effect of the

24
25

Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 893.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211 (1998).
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case seems to have been to improve the quality of boardroom
decisionmaking in control transactions. If our reasoning is correct,
the court might well have achieved the same result by describing
the behavior of the defendants in strongly judgmental tones, while
holding that the business judgment rule protected the decision. 26

VII. IMPLICATIONS FOR TEACHING THE BASIC COURSE
If one shares our view of corporate law, how does it affect the way
one teaches the basic course? There are several implications.
First, one can spend some time talking about the theories of the
firm. Why are there firms? What explains the core? What explains
the boundaries? What are the problems that a firm must solve to
accomplish its objectives, namely, to achieve some competitive
advantage? \Vhy do firms choose one particular legal form over
another? The answers to these questions help anchor the course in
the competitive market realities that corporations face .
An agency-centric theory of corporation law has a good deal to say
but its picture is incomplete and distorted, at least in part because
directors are not agents of the shareholders in the legal sense. If
students learn agency theory "too well" in an introductory section,
they will be puzzled to learn that the business and affairs of the
corporation are managed by or under the direction of a board of
directors, who, in turn, appoint the executive officers of the
corporation. Although shareholders get to vote, absent a battle for
control, they get to vote on very few matters of substance. Upon
further learning the difficulty that some shareholders face in
seeking corporate information and in advancing by-law amendments, they might incorrectly conclude that most corporate
shareholders would prefer to have more power to constrain the
board than is provided to them under Delaware corporate law.
Indeed, the great mystery for those who look at corporate law
through the agency-cost lens is why shareholders, the principals,
have so little ability to constrain the managers, their agents. If

26

The settlement ofthe case meant that the Delaware Court of Chancery never returned
to the question on remand.

f
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students interpret the statute as embedding a theory of agency, they
will either find the statute confusing or the theory mushy.
Property-rights and transaction cost theories help avoid this
confusion by introducing the fundamental economic decisions
corporations face, such as choosing their capital assets and determining the appropriate scope of vertical integration. Directors and
their appointed executive officers run the corporation because doing
so is much more likely to maximize profits. Transaction cost
theories naturally lead to the conclusion that shareholders, if given
the choice, would choose the corporate structure that exists in most
state statutes. Students grounded in the full range of theories ofthe
firm are more likely to appreciate that it is the requirements of
centralized management that generate section 141 of the Delaware
General Corporation Law and its progeny, and not some misguided
failure to appreciate the possibility that managers' interests may
diverge from those of the shareholders.
Second, an introduction to alternative organizational forms is
important. Although it is difficult to find the time in one semester,
at least a brief introduction to the unique features of partnerships,
limited partnerships, and close corporations opens the question of
the environment in which each form is best suited.
Third, one needs to spend adequate class time on the core
properties of the corporate form and how the form itself-the
statutory settings-provides a robust first-order solution to the
problems that must be solved. As part ofthis study, the comparison
between the statutory form of the corporation and that of partnership emphasizes more the differences in centralized management
and exit terms and only secondarily the difference in liability issues.
Here, in particular, one wants to focus attention on the limitations
on exit as a means to constrain minority opportunism. One also
wants to focus attention on the limitations on non-pro-rata distributions as a means of controlling majority opportunism. However, in
addition, students need to be chased around the statute, finding the
statutory provisions that create the legal properties of the form. It
is not enough for apprentice watchmakers to gaze on a watch with
wonder; they need to learn how to take it apart and put it back
together.
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Fourth, one needs to address the boundary and balance between
law and norms explicitly. One needs to introduce the concept of
non-legally enforceable rules or standards, and show that important
areas of economic activity are effectively governed by NLERS, and
that, where it works, it is a better mode of governance than legal
governance. This critical anti-"legal centrist" point is a very hard
one to get across, especially to second-year law students who are
imbued with the power and majesty of the law. We are not sure how
best to make this concept clear to students. A starting point is a
better appreciation of the role of transaction costs in determining
which activities are best organized inside the firm and which are
,b est to leave to the market. From this starting point, one can show
why law works best outside the firm and NLERS governance works
best inside.
Once one goes down this route, teaching fiduciary duties actually
becomes much easier. The duty of loyalty cases are quite straightforward on this model: they are a backstop to enforce the statutory
prohibition on non-pro-rata distributions that creates the beneficial
lock-in. These cases must be legally enforceable rather than NLERS
because self-dealing potentially transforms the relationship into a
"last period" that the weaker NLERS sanctions, many of which
depend on future interactions, cannot handle.
The duty of care-business judgment rule cases are more tricky
and more interesting. The first point that must be made is that the
business judgment rule is a jurisdictional rule. Here, the comparison with the employment-at-will doctrine is useful. Once one sees
that the function of the business judgment rule is jurisdictional, one
has an answer for why directorial malpractice looks so very different
from other forms of professional malpractice. One also gets an
answer to the question of why there is so little law in the duty of
care context. The answer is that almost all of the duty of care is
handled by NLERS.
At this point, one may want to spend some time talking about
what the NLERS of the corporation are. The first and most
important NLERS is "maximize firm value" and its variants. There
are a myriad of ways that this is enforced, with essentially none of
them being through the law. Making this point is important
because it eliminates some of the confusion created by the "for whom
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is the corporation managed?" cases, and the courts' unwillingness to
intervene to punish stupid decisions (e.g., Kamin u. American
Express Co. 27 ) or to force the managers to profit-maximize. The key
point here is that NLERS self-governance demands that the judges
stay out.
One then gets to the cases exploring the limits of the business
judgment rule. This examination takes one back to the limits of
NLERS governance, namely, last periods. Self-dealing is one form
of last period problem. Sale of the company is another. From this
approach, what justifies the heightened scrutiny that one finds in
cases like Van Gorkom and Cede is that, for example, Jerome Van
Gorkom was in a last period, having decided to retire from the firm.
On this view, also, the common practice of spending an abundance of time in the basic course on the takeover cases is problematic because the last period problem makes them fundamentally
different from other duty of care cases, such as Kamin and Joy u.
North. 28 One can fit the leading takeover cases into the overall
structure by focusing on this aspect, which helps prevent the
attempt that students typically make to transfer the doctrines of the
takeover cases into non-takeover contexts. One can also use these
cases-specifically the MBO cases in which criticism is leveled but
often without the imposition of legal sanction-to illustrate the
phenomenon of judicial participation in the evolution of NLERS.
Finally, with respect to derivative suits, one returns to the
business judgment rule as a jurisdictional rule. The demand
requirement begins to make a fair bit of sense. The question
addressed by the demand requirement is whether there is reason to
believe that the preconditions of NLERS self-governance have
broken down sufficiently that judicial scrutiny is called for, not some
odd sort of early summary judgment procedure.
Have we succeeded in transforming the basic course to comport
with our view of corporate law as a system of norms? No, but this
may be a start.

27
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383 N.Y.S.2d 807 (1976).
692 F.2d 880, 897 (2d Cir. 1982).

